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The Case for the Person in Social Psychology 
Vivien Burr 




In this paper I will critique a number of approaches to social psychology 
because in my view they have an inadequate understanding of the person, 
the being who ought to be at the centre of the discipline. I will argue that 
both mainstream social psychology and several varieties of social 
constructionism are at fault in this respect, and will make a case for 
symbolic interactionism as a way of theorising the person that can enrich 
and extend a social constructionist social psychology. Finally, I will offer 
some ideas for the questions that such a social psychology might ask and the 
research directions it might take.  
 
Today, university courses in Psychology are attracting increasing numbers 
of students. As a young person in the 1970s, I too was drawn to the 
discipline because of its apparent promise to give some insight into the 
mysteries and paradoxes of human behaviour and experience, including my 
own. But students are often discouraged by psychology’s subject matter 
because it so often studies processes, such as memory or perception, rather 
than people as we would recognised them. Social psychology is often 
popular with students because it seems at least to be about recognisable 
aspects of human life; the ‘level’ of social psychological phenomena is the 
interpersonal, and these phenomena are familiar to people: friendship and 
attraction, making impressions and forming opinions about others, being 
part of a group and so on. 
 
But as Harré (1996) points out, mainstream social psychology has 
increasingly moved in the same direction as its parent discipline; that is, 
towards cognition as its focus and information-processing as its mechanistic 
root metaphor (Sarbin, 1986). This may be an improvement upon 
behaviourism as the previous central theoretical framework, at least 
permitting the legitimate study of mental states and processes, but it has 
once again located the level of analysis in mechanisms rather than whole 
people and their interactions. Mainstream social psychology is hardly 
‘social’ at all; it mainly concerns intra-psychic processes (foe example, 
attributions and attitude formations) which may or may not even have a 
social target. 
 
In parallel to this development, and more recently, we have seen the 
emergence of what has come to be known as social constructionism (Burr, 
1995; Gergen, 1999a). Although this is a theoretical perspective as relevant 
to the whole of psychology as much as to social psychology, it has been of 
most interest to social psychologists because of its desire to relocate 
psychological phenomena in the social realm. Nevertheless, social 
constructionism is more likely to be found having a high profile at social 
psychology conferences than elsewhere. Within social constructionism, all 
psychology in effect becomes social psychology, and I like this idea. I often 
ask my students to think about a person they know fairly well, and to make 
a brief list of words they would use to describe that person- friendly, kind, 
humorous and so on. Then I tell them to imagine that person alone on a 
desert island, and to ask themselves how much sense those descriptions 
would now make, in the absence of other people. How can one be, say, 
‘generous’, ‘thoughtless’ or ‘helpful’ in a social vacuum? So, for me, social 
psychology is an immensely important discipline. 
 
But I believe that contemporary social psychology is currently heading in 
two opposite directions, both of them failing to achieve a truly social 
understanding of humanity; that is, one that transcends the dichotomies of 
individual vs. society and agency vs. determinism that have for a long time 
dogged the social sciences, and both of them threatening to lose sight of the 
person, who, to my mind, should be at the centre of our theorising.  
 
The two directions that I have identified are what I will refer to as 
mainstream social psychology, and social constructionism. I will deal 
briefly with mainstream social psychology, (but not go into detail here since 
the arguments have been well rehearsed elsewhere) and then go on to look 
at social constructionism, saying what I think is wrong with it, and then 
propose what I believe is one possible answer to these problems. 
 
Mainstream social psychology  
Mainstream social psychology has taken cognitive science as it base and has 
become preoccupied with computations supposed to be carried out within 
the person, the result of which are things like attitudes and attributions. As 
Augoustinos and Walker (1995) point out, the information-processing 
metaphor of the person that is primarily adopted in modern social cognition 
renders the approach social only in so far as the information processed is 
about social objects- that is, people (and where the attitude object is not a 
person or class of persons even this basis is absent). While not dismissing 
out of hand the contribution made by social cognition, they argue that: 
 
Currently, research and theory in social cognition is driven by an 
overwhelming individualistic orientation, which forgets that the 
contents of cognition originate in social life, in human 
interaction and communication. The information processing 
models central to social cognition study cognitive processes at 
the expense of content and context. As such, societal, collective 
and symbolic features of human thought are often ignored and 
forgotten. Contemporary social cognition research is 
individualistic because it searches within the person for the 
causes of behaviour. Social cognition will never explain 
adequately the totality of socio-cognitive experience so long as 
it remains at the individual level of analysis (pp 3-4). 
 
I am in agreement with this statement, and make no apology for my 
criticism of mainstream psychology and social psychology, which for the 
most part seem hopelessly essentialist, individualistic and hamstrung by a 
narrow vision of science. Although I would like to point out in passing that 
exceptions to this trend do exist. The theory of social representations, put 
forward by Moscovici (1984) was a genuine attempt to provide a social 
account of psychological processes. Also, the British social psychologist 
Miles Hewstone (Hewstone, 1989) notes that some work in the field of 
attribution has moved away from simple questions about intra-psychic 
mechanisms of attribution towards those concerning the role of 




Social constructionism held the promise of a radical new social psychology 
that was both critical and empowering. It promised a fundamentally 
different way of understanding what it means to be a person and different 
answers to how social and personal change might be brought about. 
 
But the way that developments in social constructionism have been heading 
in recent times makes me think that, rather than developing a better 
understanding, the social constructionist fraternity has instead divided into 
rival factions that are ‘digging in’ on opposite sides, each losing what the 
other has gained. 
 
For present purposes, I include under the heading of social constructionism 
both deconstruction and discursive psychology. I believe that deconstruction 
ultimately becomes socially deterministic, rendering the person as a puppet 
of discursive structures, and discursive psychology, while showing the 
constructive force of language, brackets off the person as meaning-maker 
behind the constructions that it analyses. I’ll say a little about my 
reservations about each of these in turn, and then go on to critique a further 
turn in the social constructionist debate, one which attempts to privilege 
interpersonal relationships as the site of the construction of the person: 
 
Deconstructionism 
Deconstructionist developments in social psychology, which, drawing on 
Foucault and Derrida, explicitly aim to re-cast the individual as a thoroughly 
social being, may themselves be unable to escape the agency vs. 
determinism dichotomy. If the person is understood as a product of 
discourse, the individual and self are seen as illusions or at best 
constructions over which we have little control. Although some writers (e.g. 
Davies and Harré, 1990) have tried to argue that the person is as much 
constructing as constructed, the processes by which this two-way exchange 
is supposed to occur are not spelled out. Given the power that is accorded to 
language in deconstructionist approaches to the person, there is therefore a 
tendency for these formulations, by default, to emphasise the formative 
power of the discourses we inhabit. Deconstruction, therefore, is in danger 
of reproducing the same individual vs. society dualism upon which 
mainstream social psychology is founded, but this time privileging the 
social rather than the individual side of the dichotomy. 
 
Discursive psychology 
Discursive psychology (e.g. Edwards and Potter, 1992; Harré and Stearns 
1995; Harré, 1995) has an advantage over the mainstream in that its 
methodology of choice (discourse analysis) explicitly studies real examples 
of situated language use, aiming to identify the forms of argument and 
rhetorical devices being used by the participants. It privileges the social 
context of speech, allowing for meaning to be situated rather than fixed. 
And it is a social psychology because of its insistence upon our use of 
shared tools (interpretative repertoires). 
 
While discursive psychology does not deny the existence of processes we 
might wish to call  ‘thought’ or ‘memory’, it does not see these as 
instrumental in the production or use of interpretative repertoires, and takes 
a radically anti-cognitive stance. For example, it is critical of the theory of 
social representations for appearing to locate these inside people’s heads, 
which then come to be thought of as lying behind and expressed in social 
interaction. Discursive psychology has been most useful in drawing social 
psychologists’ attention to the constructive use of language, to the 
variability in accounts and their dependence upon local and transient 
interaction contexts.  
 
However, I think an important and difficult issue, that discursive 
psychology largely ignores, is the relationship between the social and the 
psychological. If we are to move beyond the traditional conception of social 
psychology as the study of how the social environment affects the pre-
existing individual (which was the view of Floyd Allport, one of the 
founders of what I am calling mainstream social psychology) then we need 
theories that reconceptualise the individual in social terms. Discursive 
psychology goes some way down this road in its conceptualisation of 
language use as socially derived and socially occasioned (rather than as 
issuing from psychological states) but has not addressed the nature of the 
person as repertoire-user. Discursive psychology attempts to bracket off the 
person’s psychological life with respect to our understanding of language 
use. Although discursive psychology implicitly characterises the person as 
motivated to build socially credible and defensible accounts it does not 
explicitly address the psychological status of this. While discursive 
psychology does not deny the possible existence of structures such as 
motivations, beliefs and attitudes, it claims, as does behaviourism, that these 
are not available for our inspection. Following Wittgenstein, it argues that 
we can only treat our accounts of our experience as part of the 
‘performance’ and accomplishment of such things as anger or desire, within 
particular language-games. Just what kind of  ‘person’ we need to create in 
our psychology in order to understand what it means to be a repertoire-user 
remains a mystery to us. 
 
Now, we do not have to agree with discursive psychologists on this point. 
There is considerable debate between philosophers regarding the tenability 
of Wittgenstein’s position. But even if we agree with discursive psychology 
that concepts such as ‘motivation’, ‘drive’, ‘attitude’ and ‘belief’ are 
misleading as explanations of the content and purpose of our talk, I would 
argue that it does indeed need to specify the psychological nature of the 
discourse-using person, and the nature of the relationship between that 
psychology and the social realm in which it is located. Without this, it is 
hard to see how the discursive approach outlined here can be called a 
psychology as such.  
 
In addition, I would want to argue that the private, psychological realm 
deserves our attention, and others before have made such a case. For 
example, I have argued elsewhere (Burr, 1999) that some forms of 
experience exist outside of language and are expressed in and are accessible 
through non-linguistic forms such as art, dance and other bodily 
movements. I am reminded also of the inventive investigation, within the 
phenomenological tradition, of the lived experience of such things as anger 
and daydreams. Others (Butt and Langdridge, forthcoming) have drawn on 
the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the ‘lived body’ 
and George Mead’s ‘conversation of gestures’ to ground a socially 
contingent concept of personal experience that helps us to understand our 
conduct. 
 The person-in-relationship 
Other writers who would probably want to align themselves either fully or 
partly with a social constructionist theoretical framework (e.g. Shotter, 
1995; Gergen, 1999a and b) have proposed re-locating the crucible of 
behaviour and experience in the interpersonal space between people, within 
relationships and interactions. 
 
Discursive psychology acknowledges mental processes but, like 
behaviourism, accords them no place in the understanding of conduct. John 
Shotter (1995) talks of ‘joint action’, a term borrowed from the symbolic 
interactionist Herbert Blumer, which is like a dance where the conduct of 
each person constitutes the whole (that is the dance, the interaction) but 
where the behaviours of each participant are not isolable and cannot be said 
to cause each other.  
 
Gergen (1997) too locates psychological events (like emotion) inside 
relationship exchanges, and I wouldn’t in principle disagree with this. But 
he argues for what he calls a ‘de-psychologised account of human action’. 
This seems to arise from the fear that ‘psychology’ equals ‘mental states’ 
that cause behaviour. I think this assumption is quite unnecessary. It is 
important to emphasise here that the psychological need not be equated with 
essentialist mental states, nor be causative in any way. The dimensions of 
private vs. public, psychological vs. social and determined vs. constructed 
do not map onto each other or reduce to each other. Social and even 
relational realms can be used in just as deterministic a fashion as the 
psychological and the psychological and private can be just as contingent as 
social phenomena. So that claiming back a personal, private and 
psychological space as the proper realm of our enquiries as psychologists 
and social psychologists in no way automatically returns us to essentialism, 
determinism or possessive individualism (Sampson, 1993). I prefer to think 
of psychology as the study of the processes by which the mental and 
behavioural emerge from the social. As Dodds et al (1997) put it ‘It 
becomes important to describe how the social becomes personal without 
denying the activity and contribution of either social or personal domains’.  
 
What I do like about relocating conduct within relationships is that it 
attempts to get rid of causality (the idea that mental states cause behaviour) 
and emphasises the social dependency of conduct, apparently without 
inverting the problem and creating a reductionistic social determinism. But 
what is missing here is any understanding of how or why interactions take 
the particular course that they do. They seem to emerge magically. The 
psychological appears to have no role to play in producing them. I see the 
silence of psychologists and social psychologists on this issue as a problem, 
and so I want to go on now to draw on some older voices social psychology 
that I feel can help us out here. 
 
The case for an interactionist self-concept 
There already exist theoretical frameworks that have attempted to both build 
a model of the individual in social terms and to transcend the individual vs. 
society and social vs. psychological dichotomies, and two that I feel deserve 
particular mention here are symbolic interactionism and social 
representations theory, because they have both been put forward by social 
psychologists (interestingly, from the disciplines of psychology and 
sociology respectively). I have chosen to focus here upon the potential that I 
feel lies with symbolic interactionism, because I want to flesh out an 
argument for taking the self-concept seriously; the interactionist self concept 
can, I will argue, provide us with a route back to a psychology that can 
enrich and extend a social constructionist social psychology.  
 
The call to listen to such ‘older voices’ in social psychology is not new, and 
in 1995 Denzin attempted to forge a symbolic interactionism that is 
informed by more recent poststucturalist theorising concerning the role of 
language, discourse and power in the production of personal meanings. My 
concern here is the reciprocal of this- that is, to examine how a social 
constructionist social psychology may be extended by symbolic 
interactionist thinking. If symbolic interactionism, according to Denzin, has 
neglected the role of culture and power relations in providing the meanings 
with which individuals endow their experience, then social constructionism 
has largely avoided theorising personal experience and its role in personal 
conduct. My aim in introducing symbolic interactionism here is therefore to 
extend and strengthen social constructionism so that it becomes capable of 
understanding the nature of the socially constructed person. 
 
The term symbolic interactionism was introduced by Blumer (1962), who 
built on and extended the earlier work of George Mead (1934), and it is 
Mead’s thinking about the self that I want to draw upon here. Mead’s 
contribution lies in transcending the dualism of self vs. other, and in 
providing an account of the individual that is thoroughly social. His 
conception of mind and of consciousness, and of the relationship between 
these and society was based upon the interdependency of self and other. 
Furthermore, language and social interaction were for Mead crucial to the 
development of the mind, consciousness and the self. For Mead, the self 
does not pre-exist society, it emerges from it. His social psychology is 
therefore radically different from psychological social psychology, where 
the individual or self (in those psychologies which accept the existence of a 
self) is not dependent upon social forces for its existence. 
 Mead turns on its head psychology’s question of how individual persons, 
who are conscious and have minds, come to interact with other individuals, 
affect and be affected by them, so producing something that is called 
society. Instead, he sees consciousness and mind (our ability to reflect upon 
our actions and those of others) as the outcomes of social interaction. 
Mead’s individual does not exist independently of society but is instead 
made possible by social interaction between people. And the key to the 
development of mind is something distinctly human; our ability to use 
symbols to represent things and events, especially our use of language. It is 
language, says Mead, that allows us to internalise social interaction, to 
represent it to ourselves and to think about and reflect upon it, and this is 
what mind is.  
 
Symbolic interactionism argues that ‘society and individuals are the product 
of interaction (communication) between people and that this interaction 
takes place through the use of symbols which have meaning for the 
individuals involved’ (Flory, 2000). Both mind, our capacity for 
consciousness, for reflection upon our experience, and self are seen as made 
possible by and emerging from the processes of social interaction and 
language use. Central components of the person in this form of social 
psychology are therefore seen as socially contingent; they depend upon 
meaningful social interaction for their development in the person. We 
cannot think about or reflect upon our experience (this is what is meant by 
mind) until we are able to symbolically represent events to ourselves 
through language. And we cannot acquire language without engaging in 
social interaction. As babies, we are born already capable of rudimentary 
interaction. Babies engage in turn-taking and imitation games with their 
caregivers and the baby’s part in this ‘conversation’, its actions, becomes 
meaningful through the way the caregiver responds. Adults and older 
children respond to a baby as if its actions were already meaningful, and in 
this way both baby caregivers come to mutually define certain actions as 
having particular meanings. At this point in its development, the child is 
engaged in what Mead (1934) termed a ‘conversation of gestures’. As the 
child’s cognitive capacities increase, it becomes able to replace these 
gestures with symbols, that is, words. Through the continued process of 
social interaction, the child is able to move away from this conversation of 
gestures and participate in its society’s system of shared symbols and their 
meanings, that is, language. Language is therefore a kind of covert social 
interaction, a conversation of gestures carried out privately through the use 
of symbols. At this point, the child has become capable of truly reflecting 
upon and representing both the world and its own actions to itself and 
others. It has acquired both mind and a sense of self. 
 
For symbolic interactionism it is therefore social relationships and human 
interaction and communication that provide the basis for the development of 
the person. But it is not simply that we assign meaning to our actions and to 
those of other people. Human interaction as we would recognise it also 
demands that we have some conception of the meaning that our actions hold 
for others, and that we know that they will know that we have such a 
conception. Meaningful human social interaction is distinguished by this 
characteristic; we are able to imaginatively anticipate the effects of our 
actions on others and act accordingly. This is a result of our ability to 
represent actions through our system of shared meanings. When we interact 
through gestures, and later through language, we know that a gesture or 
word has the same meaning for others as it has for us. We therefore have a 
kind of access to the mind of others; we can anticipate the meaning that our 
actions have for them because of the meaning they have for us. We can 
therefore represent to ourselves what would happen if we were to undertake 
a certain course of action. We are able to consider alternative courses of 
possible action, which is one way of describing agency. Mead saw this 
capacity as what separates the meaningful interaction of humans from the 
meaningful interaction of other animals. 
 
So the person is a truly thoroughly social and socially contingent 
phenomenon. Harré once referred to the person as a ‘fenced-off ‘ section of 
the prairie-land that is the social realm. He was reflecting on the way in 
which what counts as ‘me’ extends well beyond the physical boundary of 
my being. I think I agree with Harré on this point. But the person is not 
ONLY this. There IS a difference between private and public (though not 
one that is so sharply drawn as in mainstream psychology) and what 
happens in my private realm has consequences for joint action. But we do 
not need to resort to causality to acknowledge a role for mental processes. 
Reflectiveness and memory are processes that inform my future conduct and 
make CHOICES possible. And it is here that I think the idea of self-concept 
can be of value. 
 
The idea of a ‘self concept’ does not dictate any particular content to that 
concept. The fact that our western self-concepts are full of personality, 
individuality and agency can be accounted for, in social constructionist 
terms, by discourse. But the fact that we have a self-concept at all cannot. I 
am happy to dispense with personality, attitudes and such like as pre-
existing or environmentally produced mental states that cause behaviour, 
but ‘self-concept’ is different in kind from these. It is socially contingent 
rather than pre-existent; it is not fixed and does not have to be seen as 
‘causing’ anything. 
 
So while our particular self-concept is not trans cultural, I believe the 
generic self-concept may be. In other words, human beings always have and 
always will have a concept of selfhood. The only thing this is contingent 
upon is social interaction. Human beings become persons when they 
become engaged in social encounters, and this makes some form of self-
concept possible and even inevitable. 
 
My self-concept arises out of reflection and is ‘there’ during all social 
interactions, in effect constituting a third ‘other’ that exerts the same ‘pull’ 
on my conduct as real interactants. We can therefore see self-concept as a 
positive asset, grounding moral choices and agency, something that social 
constructionists find very difficult to theorise. It gives me something against 
which to assess current interactions and check possible future conduct, 
through monitoring of myself during social encounters. Without the self-
concept, it is hard to see how we can avoid regarding all actors as 
interchangeable. Where do moral choices come from? If we do not want to 
claim that people’s experience of wrestling with moral dilemmas and 
choices is illusionary, that in fact our moral behaviour is simply determined 
(either by pre-existent psychological processes, or by social rules that we 
have internalised, or by force of social structures), which would be to slide 
back into the dichotomies that social constructionism is trying to escape, 
then we have to explain how it is that we have such choice and how it is that 
we have some form of collective conception, at some level,  of what is good, 
that is, basic values. It is possible to find a route to these through Mead’s 
concept of the ‘generalised other’; the other is so much a part of my make-
up that my experience is not differentiated from that of the other. It is much 
more than simply imagining what others would feel like if I treated them in 
a certain way; we feel (phenomenologically) the consequences of our 
actions upon others because we are not differentiated from the other. This is 
the ‘care’ that Gergen speaks of and wants, but he can only reach it through 
the recognition that all outcomes are jointly produced- that we all depend on 
each other. It is too utilitarian and reduces to moral expediency. 
 
The future for a social constructionist social psychology 
I am in agreement with Ryan (1999) who foresees, through the social 
constructionist turn, a radical shift in the aim and constitution of the 
behavioural sciences, but not their elimination. Social psychology will need 
to find new organising themes, new concepts and therefore new questions.  
 
Gergen regards analyses that see psychological events as existing in the 
social realm as superior to those that see them as derived from the social 
realm. I disagree with this, for the reasons I gave above about 
misunderstanding the relationship between various dichotomies. 
Nevertheless, just what it might mean for phenomena to ‘exist’ in the social 
realm is not clear. Gergen  (1999b) calls his paper ‘the place of the psyche 
in a constructed world’ but seems to find NO place for it. He leaves it lying 
on the floor between people, but neither of them knows how it got there or 
has access to it.  
 
For me, the key questions for social psychology now are these: 
 
1. How are our joint actions and co-constructions brought about? And  
2. What role does our self-concept play in this constructive process? 
 
A research programme aimed at answering these questions would capitalise 
on our capacity for reflexive self-consciousness. Elsewhere (Butt et al, 
1997) I have described how, for example, personal construct methods have 
been used to investigate how our sense of self is fragmented across 
relationships and dependent upon them, and how our feelings of authenticity 
are dependent upon the self-monitoring processes during interaction 
described by Mead. Such an approach lies broadly within a 
phenomenological framework, and I would additionally see 
phenomenological methods of enquiry as potentially able to inform us about 
the psychological processes taking place during joint actions of all kinds, 
from conversations to playing a game of tennis. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have critiqued a number of approaches to social psychology 
because in my view they do not properly address either the social nature of 
our psychology or the psychology of our social nature. I have found both 
mainstream social psychology and several varieties of social 
constructionism wanting.  I have argued that symbolic interactionism offers 
us a way of theorising the person that can enrich and extend a social 
constructionist social psychology without returning us to either essentialism 
or social determinism. It also gives us some purchase on how individual 
persons are able to reflect upon and make choices about their own conduct 
while at the same time retaining social relationships and interactions as the 
crucial sites where we can become persons at all. Finally, I have tried to 
offer some ideas for the questions that such a social psychology might ask 
and the research directions it might take. I hope that, even if you don’t agree 
with my arguments here, that you will at least agree with me that the person 
needs to be put back into social psychology. 
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